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Abstract
In this paper we examine the sustainability of euro area public finances against the backdrop of
population ageing. We critically assess the widely used projections of the Working Group on Ageing
Populations (AWG) of the EU's Economic Policy Committee and argue that ageing costs may be
higher than projected in the AWG reference scenario. Taking into account adjusted headline
estimates for ageing costs, largely based upon the sensitivity analysis carried out by the AWG, we
consider alternative indicators to quantify sustainability gaps for euro area countries. With respect to
the policy implications, we assess the appropriateness of different budgetary strategies to restore
fiscal sustainability taking into account intergenerational equity. Our stylised analysis based upon
the lifetime contribution to the government's primary balance of different generations suggests that
an important degree of pre-funding of the ageing costs is necessary to avoid shifting the burden of
adjustment in a disproportionate way to future generations. For many euro area countries this
implies that the medium-term targets defined in the context of the revised stability and growth pact
would ideally need to be revised upwards to significant surpluses.
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Introduction
Populations are ageing rapidly in nearly all EU Member States, due to gradually increasing life
expectancy, the baby-boom baby-bust cycle observed in the second half of the last century and a
long-run trend towards low birth rates. Awareness of the potentially very important
macroeconomic and budgetary implications of these demographic changes has increased in
recent years. Authorities now routinely try to gauge the impact of population ageing on the
sustainability of public finances and increasingly take into account the findings of these studies
when defining their economic policies. In this connection, a three-pronged strategy was
formulated at the Stockholm European Council in 2001. It entails a rapid reduction of public
debt, an increase in employment and productivity and reforms to existing pension, health and
long-term care systems. Policy responses should obviously comply with all relevant EU fiscal
rules and be tailored to restore fiscal sustainability in a timely manner.
With respect to the budgetary pillar of that three-pronged strategy and in accordance with the
Conclusions of the ECOFIN Council of 9 October 2007, long-term fiscal sustainability, notably
the future impact of ageing, is to be better taken into account in the definition of the medium-
term objectives (MTOs) for fiscal policy introduced in the context of the revised stability and
growth pact. One of the key questions in this respect is to what extent future ageing-related
expenditure should be pre-funded by attaining high primary surpluses in the coming years.
This paper does not provide any insights on which policy mix, e.g. structural reforms vs.
budgetary pre-funding, is the optimal response to population ageing. It simply wants to
contribute to the debate on the appropriate timing of the budgetary component of the response
to population ageing - and the definition of 'ageing-augmented' MTOs in particular - keeping all
other things equal. We specifically analyse the relative merits of an 'early' fiscal adjustment
(implying a strong fiscal tightening for many countries in the following years) and a more gradual
fiscal adjustment. In this connection, we propose to use intergenerational equity as the main
criterion and to look into the intergenerational implications of these two stylised strategies on the
basis of the lifetime net contribution to the government's primary balance of different cohorts.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The first section assesses the EU-wide
projections of the ageing costs used as a benchmark in the current institutional context. This is
done on the basis of a detailed analysis for most euro area countries.1 On the basis of this
assessment, we present alternative estimates of the ageing costs for each of the different
countries considered. The second section is devoted to the quantification of the sustainability
gaps (taking into account the alternative estimates of the ageing costs). The third section then
looks at the intergenerational implications of different adjustment strategies to restore fiscal
sustainability along the lines suggested above for a selected group of euro area countries
(Belgium, Germany, and France). The final section presents some concluding remarks.
1   Individual country fiches are not included in the main text of this paper but are made available in an Annex
which can be downloaded from http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/scientific/wps/date/html/index.en.html or
obtained from the authors.
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1 Age-related expenditure projections by the Working Group on Ageing
Populations: a risk-assessment exercise
1.1 The projections of the Working Group on Ageing Populations: a bird’s eye view
From the mid-80s, when it became apparent that Western countries were experiencing major
changes in their demographic structure, an increasing number of studies have examined the long-
term prospects for public budgets. These studies usually focus on expenditure items which are
particularly dependent on the age structure of populations (pensions, health, education). Some
studies also develop projections for the primary balance and estimate the adjustment required to
ensure budgetary sustainability (usually meaning a stable undiscounted debt to GDP ratio).
International organisations have been at the forefront in the development of the literature.2 Their
studies allowed cross-country comparison thanks to methodological homogeneity. However,
since the reliability of age-related expenditure projections depends on detailed and updated
institutional knowledge, the paucity of national projections represented a major drawback.
Growing awareness of the impact of population ageing gradually led to a substantial increase in
the resources devoted to national long-term expenditure projections. Yet, at the turn of the
century, projections for the main age-related expenditure items were available only for a few
industrial countries.
Against this background, the age-related expenditure projections by the Working Group on
Ageing Populations (AWG) for EU member states come with a unique value added. They are
produced in a multilateral setting involving national authorities and an international organisation,
thus reconciling as much as possible national detail and cross-country comparability.
The 2006 AWG report covers 25 EU member states and for most of them provides projections
for pensions, health care, long-term care, education, and unemployment benefits (EPC and EC,
2006).3 The projections reflect the impact of enacted legislation, including provisions already
legislated but coming only into force over time. The report is rich in sensitivity analysis.
In the report, the main results under the reference scenario are summarised as follows4: “Overall,
ageing populations” (are) “projected to lead to increases in public spending in most Member
States by 2050 on the basis of current policies, although there is a wide degree of diversity across
countries. The following points should be highlighted:
x for the EU15 and the Euro-area as a whole, public spending is projected to increase by about
4 percentage points between 2004 and 2050; […]
x most of the projected increase in public spending will be on pensions, health care and long-
term care. Potential offsetting savings in terms of public spending on education and
unemployment benefits are likely to be limited;
x the budgetary impact of ageing in most Member States starts to become apparent as of 2010.
However, the largest increases in spending […] take place between 2020 and 2040”
2 See Heller et al. (1986), Leibfritz et al. (1995), and Franco and Munzi (1997).
3 Countries included are the EU15 (the 12 countries in the euro area at the time of the report – Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal – plus
Denmark, Sweden and the UK) and EU10 (the ten new member states which joined the union before the
report was prepared: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak
Republic, and Slovenia). Not all expenditure items are projected for all countries.
4 EC and EPC, 2006, p. 10. See also the table reproduced later in the main text.
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This paper focuses on the countries that were in the euro area at the time of the AWG report.
The assumptions underlying the AWG baseline projections are analysed in detail in this section in
order to assess whether the underlying risks are broadly balanced or not. To this end we mostly
rely on sensitivity analyses accompanying AWG projections.
The AWG projections encompass five public expenditure items which are likely to be affected by
ageing: pensions, health care, long-term care, education and unemployment. Most of these items
directly depend on the age structure of populations. Other expenditure items not considered by
the AWG, such as family allowances, may also depend on demographics. Certain revenue
categories may also be affected by population ageing: ageing-induced shifts in consumption
patterns may have an impact on indirect taxes while taxes and social contributions levied on
wages obviously depend on the age structure of the population.
1.2 The AWG projections for ageing-related spending in the euro area: main results
The AWG projections encompass the 2004-2050 period but we choose to focus on the 2010-
2050 period since the projected change between 2004 and 2010 has in some cases been outdated
by new data and most of the expenditure increase occurs after 2010.5
Graph 1: Changes in dependency ratios and expenditure ratio (2010-2050)
Ageing-related spending rises by 4.3 p.p. of GDP on average in the euro area (excluding Greece6)
over the 2010-2050 period in the baseline scenario of the AWG (Table 1.1). Increases range from
1.1 p.p. (Austria) to 8.9 p.p. of GDP (Spain). For most countries, expenditure peaks around 2040.
For all countries except Austria and Italy the bulk of the increase comes from pensions. For Italy,
this reflects the introduction of a defined-contribution scheme in 1995. In Austria, it is the result
of reforms enacted as of 2000 which increased the legal retirement age, linked contributions more
5   Early in 2007 a major social security reform was approved in Portugal. Updated projections, peer-reviewed at
the AWG and approved at the EPC in October 2007, are used throughout this paper.
6   Pension and long-term care expenditure data were not provided for Greece in the AWG projection exercise.
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closely to benefits (with actuarial reductions for early pensions) and switched the indexation rule
for pensions from wages to prices as of 2006.
There is no clear correlation between projected expenditure increases and expected changes in
old-age dependency ratios. Graph 1 shows that Italy and Austria, whose dependency ratios are
expected to increase more than average, are the countries where expenditure is projected to grow
least. At the same time, the countries where expenditure is projected to grow most (Luxembourg,
Spain and Ireland) and by similar amounts (around 8 p.p. of GDP) are characterised by very
different expected increases in dependency ratios (from 15 to 40 p.p.).  This reflects differences
in pension systems rules or maturity and/or in health and long-term care policies.
1.3 The AWG projections for ageing-related spending in the euro area: main assumptions
1.3.1 Demographic assumptions
The demographic scenario underlying the expenditure projections was prepared by Eurostat. It is
based on, though not identical to, the EUROPOP2004 projection released by Eurostat in 2005.7
The fertility rate assumptions are the same as those in the baseline of EUROPOP2004; the
assumptions on life expectancy at birth are based on a scenario produced by Eurostat specifically
for the AWG; the migration assumptions are the same as those in the baseline of
EUROPOP2004 except for Germany, Italy and Spain, where adjustments were made to the level
and/or age structure of migrants to incorporate more recent information.
More specifically:
x fertility rates increase over the projection period in all countries except France and Ireland,
where small declines are projected for the sake of convergence. Fertility rates remain well
below the replacement rate stabilising population size (2.1). Nevertheless, except for France
and Ireland, the downward past trends are assumed to be curbed;
x life expectancy at birth is projected to rise further, though at a slower pace than over the
1960-2000 period, when it increased by about eight years in EU countries (three months per
annum).
In this scenario population in the euro area will not be much smaller in 2050, but it will be
significantly older: population of working age will decline by 16 percent. This aggregate picture
hides wide cross-country variation. The population is projected to fall sharply in Italy and
Germany and to increase substantially in France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium and
Luxemburg. Changes in the age structure of population are less diverse. Population aged less than
15 years and population of working age (from 15 to 64 years old) will decline in all countries
except Ireland and Luxembourg (by 17% and 16% respectively, for the euro area). Population
aged 65 or more will increase in all countries, with hikes ranging from 17% to 30%.
7   ‘EU-25 population rises until 2025, then falls’, Eurostat press release 448/2005, 8 April 2005.
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Table 1.1 - Changes in age-related public expenditure ratios between 2010 and 2050 projected by AWG
Level Level Level Level Level Level
2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050 2010 2030 2050
BE 10.4 4.3 5.1 6.4 0.7 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.9 2.0 -0.20 -0.2 5.2 -0.20 -0.2 25.1 4.8 6.6
DE 10.5 1.8 2.6 6.3 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.1 -0.2 -0.2 3.6 -0.3 -0.4 22.5 2.2 3.9
GR - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ES 8.9 2.9 6.8 6.3 1.0 2.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 0.9 -0.2 -0.2 3.2 -0.2 -0.1 19.7 3.7 8.9
FR 12.9 1.4 1.9 8.0 0.9 1.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.1 -0.2 -0.2 4.7 -0.2 -0.2 27.0 2.0 3.1
IE 5.2 2.7 5.9 5.5 0.9 1.8 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 3.5 -0.3 -0.4 15.4 3.4 7.9
IT 14 1.0 0.7 6.0 0.7 1.1 1.5 0.2 0.7 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 3.9 -0.4 -0.2 25.7 1.6 2.3
LU 9.8 5.2 7.6 5.3 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.0 -0.1 3.1 -0.4 -0.7 19.4 5.6 8.4
NL 7.6 3.1 3.6 6.3 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.0 0.3 1.5 0.0 0.0 4.7 -0.1 -0.1 20.6 4.1 5.2
AT 12.8 1.2 -0.6 5.5 0.8 1.3 0.7 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 4.6 -0.4 -0.5 24.2 1.8 1.1
PT 11.9 1.5 4.1 6.8 -0.2 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.0 4.7 -0.2 0.1 24.7 1.2 5.0
FI 11.2 2.8 2.5 5.8 0.8 1.2 1.9 1.1 1.6 1.2 -0.1 -0.1 5.6 -0.2 -0.3 25.6 4.5 5.0
EA-11 (excluding



















  Source:  EC  (2006)
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Table 1.2- Population of working age, participation rates, unemployment: changes over the 2003-2050 period
Population of working age (1) Participation rate (2) Workforce (1) Unemployment (2) Employment (1)
2003 2050 2003 2050 2003 2050 2003 2050 2003 2050
Austria 5.5 4.7 72.2 79.1 4.0 3.7 4.3 3.4 3.8 3.6
Belgium 6.8 6.3 65.0 70.0 4.4 4.4 8.2 6.5 4.1 4.1
Finland 3.5 3.0 74.5 79.6 2.6 2.4 9.2 6.5 2.4 2.2
France 39.0 37.4 69.3 73.1 27.0 27.3 9.0 7.0 24.6 25.4
Germany 55.5 45.0 72.6 79.0 40.3 35.6 7.0 7.0 37.5 33.1
Greece 7.5 5.9 65.3 69.9 4.9 4.1 9.8 7.0 4.4 3.8
Spain 29.1 22.9 67.5 76.7 19.6 17.6 11.6 7.0 17.4 16.3
Ireland 2.7 3.2 68.8 77.2 1.9 2.5 4.8 3.4 1.8 2.4
Italy 38.5 29.3 62.9 70.3 24.2 20.6 8.9 6.5 22.1 19.3
Luxembourg 0.3 0.4 65.0 68.4 0.2 0.3 3.7 4.2 0.2 0.3
the Netherlands 11.0 10.6 76.4 80.4 8.4 8.5 3.7 3.2 8.1 8.2
Portugal 7.1 5.5 72.7 77.7 5.2 4.3 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.0
Euro-area avg. 206.5 174.2 69.1 75.3 142.7 131.2 9.0 6.4 129.8 122.8





The participation rate is projected to increase by about 6 p.p. over 2003-2050 in the euro area. As a result,
the workforce declines less than population of working age (8% versus 16%). This mainly reflects the
tendency for women belonging to recent cohorts to have participation levels higher than those of older
cohorts. Moreover, the trend reduction in participation rates due to population ageing is assumed to be
offset by the effects of pension reforms.
Unemployment rates are assumed to rapidly converge to their structural level and stay constant thereafter.
Unemployment in the euro area is projected to fall from 9.0% in 2003 to 7.6% in 2010 and 6.4% in 2050.
As a result, the reduction in the number of employed people over 2003-2050 is lower than the reduction
in the workforce (5% versus 8%).
Labour productivity growth rises from 1.1% on average over the 2004-10 period, to 1¾% over the 2011-
50 period, thus limiting the slowdown in GDP growth due to falling employment.
1.3.2  “Expenditure” assumptions
Given legislation and past contributory careers, pensions are mostly determined by demographic and
macroeconomic assumptions, but projections for health and long-term care also depend on other
elements such as the evolution over time of: (1) age and gender-contingent demand and consumption of
health and long-term care (as summarised in expenditure profiles by age category), and (2) the relative
cost of services.
The AWG reference scenario for health expenditure assumes that: (a) half of the projected increase in life
expectancy is spent in good health8, (b) the income elasticity of health care spending is close to one, and
(c) the relative cost of health services does not change over time.
Long-term care projections assume that (a) age-specific disability rates fall by half of the projected
decrease in age-specific mortality rates, (b) unit costs increase in line with GDP per worker, and (c) the
probability of receiving formal care remains constant. The first assumption implies that about half of the
projected gains in life expectancy up to 2050 would be spent in good health and free of disability. The
second assumption acknowledges the labour-intensive nature of the sector and, hence, the likelihood of
increasing relative costs (different from the reference scenario for health care). The third assumption
implies that the share of elderly people receiving formal care remains constant.
1.4 Risk assessment
Long-term projection exercises are subject to many uncertainties. These stem from various elements such
as macroeconomic or demographic assumptions and the policy implementation risks (e.g. as regards
current legislation for pension systems including rules on indexation of pension benefits). We try to
identify and assess these risks in the AWG projections and, where they are deemed likely to materialise
and quantifiable, we factor them into the projections (see section 1.5).9
1.4.1 Demographic and macroeconomic assumptions
Changes in life expectancy and old-age dependency ratios may be underestimated. Projections underlying
the AWG 2006 exercise were based on the 2000 census. For the countries considered here, a comparison
8   This is an intermediate hypothesis between a “pure ageing” assumption (the age profile of per capita spending on health
remains constant over time so that all gains in life expectancy are assumed to be spent in bad health) and a “constant
health” assumption (all future gains in life expectancy are spent in good health).
9   We focus the discussion below on the area as a whole. For an overview of the different countries, please refer to the
country fiches in the aforementioned Annex.
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with earlier projections based on the 1995 census shows that in the population projections used by the
AWG: (a) life expectancy at birth in the base year of the projections is, on average, about one year higher
for both men and women; (b) the projected increase in life expectancy at birth up to 2050 is almost one
year higher for men; (c) the old-age dependency ratio is 1.5 p.p. higher both at the beginning and at the
end of the projection.
Available information suggests that the next update of demographic projections could result in revisions
of a similar nature in several countries. Moreover, other demographic assumptions (such as those
concerning increases in fertility rates) can be questioned. Longevity projections are surrounded by a
significant degree of uncertainty. The degree of this uncertainty is difficult to measure. In the past, the
numbers of the elderly (especially the oldest) were systematically under-predicted (Visco, 2006). Yet, this
is the group on which much of age-related expenditure is concentrated. There are also significant lags in
the production and adoption of mortality tables.
With respect to the macroeconomic assumptions, the projected increase in the participation rate can be
considered either as too optimistic or too fast in some countries. Indeed, the overall employment rate is
assumed to reach the 70% Lisbon employment rate target in 2020. Yet, in some countries, improvements
made until now do not seem to be in line with this assumption. Finally, concerning the assumed evolution
of unemployment one should consider both the variability of NAIRU estimates and the ad-hoc nature of
the assumptions regarding the convergence to the EU-15 average.
1.4.2 “Expenditure” assumptions
With respect to pension expenditure, risks primarily pertain to the development of entitlements. Specific
risks may come from the rising share of the elderly in the voting population, in particular for countries
where the replacement ratio is low and/or indexation of pension benefits is lower than nominal wage
growth.
Demography and health status are not the only determinants of the evolution of health-care expenditure.
Medical practices may change due to technological improvements or to consumer preferences. Moreover,
relative costs might increase as productivity growth in the health sector is lower than in the rest of the
economy. In the AWG reference scenario, however, all factors different from the evolution of morbidity
are taken account of by assuming an elasticity of expenditure to income that is 1.1 at the beginning of the
period, gradually declining to 1 thereafter. While the AWG justifies this assumption with OECD data
showing that the elasticity has declined in the nineties relative to the eighties (EC 2005), this is likely to be
due to the enactment of cost-containment policies (price caps, wage moderation). These policies cannot
be sustained forever (Dormont et al, 2007). Assuming a series of repeated cost-cutting reforms would be
difficult to reconcile with a no-policy change scenario. The upside risks concerning income elasticity
appear larger when considering that it is used as a catch-all term capturing also technological
developments. Oliveira Martins and Maisonneuve (2006) show that the growth of health care expenditure
per capita has been constantly 1 p.p. higher than that implied by ageing and forecast health status.
Pressure for more public provision/financing of long-term care services could grow in the coming
decades due to changes in family structure and women labour market participation. These trends may
constrain the supply of informal care within households. For countries with less developed formal care
systems today, the projected increase in public spending may underestimate the pressure.10
10   This issue is more relevant for the 'southern' Euro-area countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain than for
Finland, where formal long-term care is already more developed (partly reflecting higher female employment rates).
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Table 1.3- Euro Area: Modifications to AWG projections and their sources (% of GDP)






BE 5.1 5.1 1.2 1.4 0.0 0.2 0.9 1.1 0.0 0.2 6.6 7.0 0.0 0.4
DE 2.6 2.5 0.9 1.4 0.2 0.3 1.0 1.5 0.1 0.4 3.9 4.8 0.5 0.4
GR - 12.0 - 1.5 - - - 1.8 - - - 15.4 - -
ES 6.8 6.8 2.0 2.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.0 0.8 8.9 9.9 0.0 1.0
FR 1.9 2.4 1.5 1.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.2 3.1 4.1 0.7 0.4
IE 5.9 5.9 1.8 2.2 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.0 0.3 7.9 8.6 0.0 0.7
IT 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.7 1.5 0.1 0.7 2.3 3.5 0.3 0.9
LU 7.6 7.6 1.0 1.4 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.3 8.4 9.1 0.0 0.7
NL 3.6 3.6 1.1 1.3 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.1 0.0 0.8 5.2 6.2 0.0 1.0
AT -0.6 -0.2 1.3 1.7 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.3 0.0 0.5 1.1 2.4 0.5 0.8
PT 4.1 4.1 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.0 0.4 5.0 5.6 0.0 0.6
FI 2.5 2.5 1.2 1.4 0.0 0.2 1.6 2.1 0.0 0.5 5.0 5.7 0.0 0.7
EA-12 - 3.1 - 1.6 - - - 1.1 - - - 5.5 - -
EA-11 (excluding
Greece) 2.8 2.9 1.3 1.6 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.1 0.0 0.5 4.3 5.3 0.3 0.6
(*) enterely due to higher life expectancy. For Germany, it also includes consequences of recent pension reforms.




























Sources: EPC and EC (2006) and country studies contained in the aforementioned Annex
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1.5 Factoring the risks into the projections
An in-depth risk assessment was carried out for individual euro area member states.11 On this basis the
AWG reference scenario was modified in a mechanical way taking into account plausible alternative
assumptions for key parameters and mostly using information from AWG sensitivity analyses with a view
to addressing some of the concerns discussed above.
For countries where more recent demographic projections are available indicating higher life expectancy
than in the AWG reference scenario, we increase the expenditure projection by multiplying the difference
between those more recent life expectancy estimates and the ones used by the AWG with the impact of
a n e x t r a  l i f e  y e a r  o n s p e n d i n g  a s  e s t i m a t e d  b y  t h e  A W G  ( a n i n c r e a s e  i n l i f e  e x p e c t a n c y  a t  b i r t h  o f
1-1.5 year by 2050 is estimated to increase both pension and health expenditure by 0.3 p.p. on average in
the EU).12
W e  a l s o  u s e  a  c o n s t a n t  i n c o m e  e l a s t i c i t y  o f  h e a l t h  e x p e n d i t u r e  a s  t h e  b e n c h m a r k  a s s u m p t i o n  ( 1 . 1
throughout the projection period). AWG estimates suggest that an increase of 0.1 in the income elasticity
of health spending leads to an expenditure increase of 0.6 percent of GDP on average in the euro area.
Finally, our headline scenario is based upon an increase in the provision of formal long-term care. We
refer to an AWG simulation based on the assumption of an increase by 1% a year in the share of
dependent elderly people receiving formal care, for the 2004-2020 period, with half the additional people
receiving care in institutions and the other half at home: this entails an expenditure increase of 1.1 p.p. of
GDP compared to the AWG reference scenario.
1.6 Conclusions and limitations of our work
This different set of assumptions leads to a projected increase in spending of 5.3 p.p. of GDP for the
euro area (excluding Greece13), 1 p.p. more than in the AWG reference scenario (Table 1.3). Higher life
expectancy only accounts for 0.3 p.p. of GDP; the effect is especially high for France, Germany and
Austria. The increase in formal long-term care leads to 0.5 p.p. of GDP of extra spending, with peaks in
Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy. Finally, constant income elasticity of health-care spending inflates
projected expenditure by 0.2 p.p. of GDP.
By confining ourselves to alternative AWG scenarios we may still underestimate risks. For instance, a 1.1
income elasticity of health expenditure may still be low; the increase in long-term care may be stronger
than what is implied by assuming that per capita spending grows in line with GDP per worker; the shift
towards formal long-term care may be more marked than in the AWG scenario.
In addition, we do not take into account policy implementation risks which are especially difficult to
quantify as, by their very nature, they reflect entirely discretionary decisions. Such risks may be large. In
some countries pensions are indexed to prices only; this will lead to a substantial decline in benefit ratios
between the start and the end of the retirement period which may be unsustainable.14 There is also a risk
that the falling purchasing power of pensions in relation to wage growth will exert pressures on other
social security schemes. Pension reforms may thus generate additional costs in the form of income
11   Please refer to the aforementioned Annex.
12   Our use of recent demographic projections is incomplete. New projections do not necessarily revise life expectancy alone.
For example, in the case of France, higher fertility rate would partly offset the impact of higher life expectancy on long
term expenditure. We could not take this into account as there is no AWG alternative scenario for fertility rates.
13   Including Greece (with alternative sources, documented in the aforementioned Annex) the increase in spending amounts
to 5.5 p.p.
14   Knell et al (2006) and the Study Group on Ageing (2007) discuss, respectively, the cases of Austria and of Belgium.
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support and other benefits. Moreover, while projections are based on current legislation, the
implementation of provisions to adjust pension spending to demography over time may be delayed.15
Finally, we do not factor in macroeconomic risks. The AWG estimates that lower labour productivity
growth by 0.25 p.p. over the projection horizon increases the level of pension spending by 0.4 p.p. of
GDP on average in the EU. In the euro area changes are the highest in Portugal (1.3 p.p. of GDP) and in
Austria and Spain (1.0 p.p.), while in Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands pensions are
connected to earnings and no change is projected due to lower productivity. An employment rate which is
1 p.p. higher than the baseline is projected to result in only small changes (in the 0.0-0.1 range for most
countries), unless the increase is concentrated among older workers (an increase by 5 p.p. in the
employment rate of older workers is projected to reduce spending by 0.2 p.p. of GDP on average in the
euro area, with the highest impacts, 0.3-0.4 p.p., in France, Austria and Belgium).
2 Ageing and fiscal sustainability
As indicated in the previous section, ageing will have a substantial impact on the budget balances of
almost all euro area countries considered in the 2010-2050 period. In this section, the implications for the
sustainability of public finances will be assessed. The first paragraph briefly reviews the theoretical notion
of fiscal sustainability and assesses deficit-dynamics in the countries considered. The second paragraph
then looks into the quantification of the sustainability gaps for these individual euro area countries.
2.1 Fiscal sustainability and deficit-debt dynamics
The notion of fiscal sustainability typically refers to the possibility of continuing current fiscal policy:
sustainable policies are those that can be indefinitely continued while unsustainable policies will ultimately
have to be modified. However, while the general intuition is clear, different specifications have been
provided in the literature16, generally pertaining to restrictions on the evolution of public debt.
From a theoretical point of view, notions of sustainability fall into two broad families (Spaventa, 1987).
According to Domar (1944), the public debt ratio should converge to a finite value in order to avoid that
the tax burden has to rise continuously. Other specifications in the same vein, such as those advocated by
Buiter (1985) and Blanchard et al (1990), are more specific and require the debt ratio to converge back to
its initial level. These definitions try to capture the idea, first advanced by Keynes (1923) that an ever-
increasing tax-rate is not sustainable in the long-run.
According to a second, less restrictive notion of sustainability, fiscal policies are sustainable as long as the
discounted value of all future primary surpluses equals the current level of public debt (see for example
Blanchard et al, 1990). This is in turn true if and only if in the long run the rate of growth of the debt-to-
GDP ratio is lower than the interest rate17. Hence, the 'intertemporal budget constraint' expressed in
ratios to GDP is more agnostic with respect to the path of public debt than the other definitions of
sustainable policies.
Despite the absence of a clear-cut theoretical benchmark, the 'conventional wisdom' definition of fiscal
sustainability would imply that continuously rising and/or extremely high debt ratios are unsustainable.
15   In Italy actuarial updates adjusting entitlements to life expectancy, legislated in 1995 and due in 2005, were postponed.
Based on a recent agreement between the government and trade unions, the update is expected to take place in 2010.
16   See Balassone and Franco (2000) for a detailed overview.
17   An infinite number of sequences for the primary balance can in principle satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint and
if the latter is expressed in ratios to GDP, some sequences may even imply a continuously increasing debt ratio.
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Against this background, it seems appropriate to first assess the impact of ageing on deficit-debt dynamics
in the absence of any policy changes.
To this end, budgetary outcomes for 2050 are calculated here taking into account the macroeconomic
projections of the AWG's 2006 Report (European Commission, 2006) and assuming that from 2008
onwards the primary balance is only affected by the ageing-related changes in government expenditure
determined in section 1. The implicit interest rate on public debt was assumed to converge to 5.1%
(which corresponds to a real rate of 3% and inflation of 2%, as assumed by the AWG) for all countries by
2015. No deficit-debt adjustments were taken into account. A similar set of assumptions will be used
throughout this section for the calculation of the different sustainability indicators.
Graph 2.1 - Fiscal outcomes in the absence of policy changes
1
(percentages of GDP; lightly shaded bars indicate favourable deficit-debt dynamics in the post-2050
period)
¹  Assuming that government revenue and non-ageing related primary expenditure (in structural terms) remain constant with respect to
GDP at the 2007 level and that the implicit interest rate on public debt gradually converges to 5.1% by 2015.
This exercise suggests that, taking into account the likely budgetary consequences of population ageing in
the next decades, public finances are currently only sustainable in Finland. That country would still record
a budget surplus of close to 2.5% of GDP in 2050 with a negative public debt ratio of some 60% of
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GDP18. Only in Finland deficit-debt dynamics would be favourable at the end of the period considered.
All other countries considered would end up with substantial and increasing deficit and debt ratios in
2050 (only in Austria, Germany and Spain public debt would be smaller than GDP in 2050). Hence, it
seems clear that in all countries considered, except Finland, policies will ultimately have to be modified.
2.2 Measurement of sustainability gaps
As is clear from the wide range of deficit and debt ratios attained in 2050, the extent to which policies
have to be changed in order to restore fiscal sustainability differs from country to country. Different
approaches for the measurement of these 'sustainability gaps' exist. They typically attempt to quantify the
fiscal effort required to reach a certain outcome at a pre-determined date in the future.
In this connection, the tax-gap indicator proposed by Blanchard et al (1990) can be considered as one of
the most general examples: it measures the required change in the tax ratio that, taking into account the
projected development of primary expenditure and assumptions concerning the implicit interest rate on
public debt and deficit-debt adjustments, would yield the same public debt ratio at the end of a given
period as the one existing at the beginning of that period. In the context of the ageing problem, the
period considered could be the one covered by the projections of ageing-related expenditure pressures
(until 2050 in the case of the AWG) and the indicator would then measure the adjustment needed to
avoid an increase in the debt ratio due to ageing.
2.2.1 Sustainability indicators used by the European Commission
The European Commission typically uses two quantitative indicators in its assessment of the sustainability
of public finances in EU Member States (e.g. European Commission, 2007). The so-called S1 indicator is
inspired by both the tax-gap indicator proposed by Blanchard et al. and the reference value for public
debt defined in the Treaty on the European Community: it is defined as the size of the 'permanent
budgetary adjustment necessary for the gross consolidated debt to reach 60% of GDP in 2050'. It is more
specifically defined as the difference between the primary balance required in a certain target year to bring
the debt ratio to 60% in 2050 - assuming that, after the target year, the primary balance is only affected by
the ageing-related expenditure increases - and the one actually projected for that target year. It should be
stressed that this S1 indicator is time-dependent: The S1 indicators published by the European Commission
are typically linked to a target year in the medium term (e.g. at the end of the time horizon of the stability
programmes) but, in principle, S1 can also be calculated using t+1 as the target year. Apart from the
estimates of these ageing costs, the calculation of S1 also depends on a number of assumptions pertaining
to activity growth, the implicit-interest rate on public debt and deficit-debt adjustments.
The S1 indicator was re-calculated using 2015 as the target year and taking into account the ageing costs
derived in section 1 and using similar assumptions (e.g. on activity growth, the implicit interest rate on
public debt, deficit-debt adjustments) as above. For the debt ratio, the gross consolidated debt according
to the Maastricht definition was used19. The results show that Austria, Germany and, especially, Finland
18   It should be stressed that, in actual practice, a gross consolidated debt ratio (Maastricht definition) can not fall below
zero. Negative values for debt ratios used throughout this paper should be understood as a(n increase in the) net financial
asset position.
19   For some countries, the European Commission subtracts assets in pension funds from the debt position and therefore
uses a modified (net) debt concept (see European Commission, 2005). In theory, i.e. with perfect capital markets,
including financial assets as a stock variable in the intertemporal budget constraint leads to the same result as including
the return on these assets as a flow variable since, from a present-value perspective, future interest or dividend payments
would be equal to the current value of assets. Including both, the stock and the flow variable, however, would imply that
the assets are counted twice. As the primary balance includes returns on financial assets, our calculations are based on
gross debt figures (i.e. without deducting public pension fund assets).
In addition, we – like the EC (2007) – assume that returns on property income stay constant in relation to GDP which
requires a growing asset position. While this might not be fully consistent with the assumption of zero deficit-debt
adjustments, the resulting error should be small for most countries. Only for countries with large financial asset positions
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would overshoot the primary balance required by 2015 to reach a 60% debt ratio in 2050 without any
policy changes, as witnessed by the negative values for the S1 indicator. All other countries considered
need to tighten fiscal policy in order to prevent the debt ratio from exceeding 60% in 2050 with the
required improvements in the primary balance ranging from 0.2% of GDP for Spain to 9.4% of GDP for
Greece20. These estimates are more pessimistic than those by the European Commission (4/2006), that
considers public finances of IE, NL and FI as sustainable according to S1. As pointed out in Langenus
(2006) the S1 indicator can be criticised as closing the indicated sustainability gap, i.e. bringing the primary
balance to the level suggested by the indicator, only leads to a certain debt ratio by 2050 but does not
restrict debt dynamics after that date in any way. For all of the countries considered here, debt dynamics
would actually be unfavourable if they implement the fiscal adjustment suggested by the S1 indicator:
keeping the primary balance constant after 2050 would imply a (rapidly) increasing debt ratio from the
level of 60% in 2050, which seems at odds with the 'common wisdom' definition of fiscal sustainability. In
addition, this clearly violates the Maastricht convergence criterion requiring that debt ratios above 60%
have to be reduced at a satisfactory pace.
Graph 2.2 - Sustainability indicators: S12015
(percentages of GDP)
The second sustainability indicator that is routinely used by the European Commission, the so-called S2
indicator, is more directly linked to the aforementioned theoretical definition of sustainability proposed by
Blanchard et al (1990): it measures the size of the 'permanent budgetary adjustment necessary to fulfil the
intertemporal budget constraint' (European Commission, 2007). It should be stressed that, in principle, an
infinite number of sequences for the primary balance can satisfy this constraint. Hence, the indicator
needs to be defined more clearly to be operational.
A s  f o r  S 1 ,  t h e  S 2  i n d i c a t o r  u s e d  b y  t h e  E u r o p e a n  C o m m i s s i o n  i s  t i m e - d e p e n d e n t .  T h e  r e q u i r e d
'permanent budgetary adjustment' is calibrated as the difference between the primary balance required in a
certain target year to equate the present value of the sequence of all future primary balances in
percentages of GDP (and assuming that, after the target year, the primary balance is only affected by the
ageing-related spending increases) to the debt ratio projected at the beginning of the target year and the
(the Netherlands and Finland) the sustainability indicators might more substantially underestimate the true size of the
problem (see European Commission, 2006).
20   As the AWG report (EPC and EC, 2006) does not provide any projections for pension expenditure alternative sources
were used, most notably the pension projections in the updates of the Greek stability programme. For further details
please see the Greek country fiche in the aforementioned Annex.
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primary balance actually projected for that target year. Under the assumption that growth and interest








































with:  pbi = (projected) primary balance for year i (in percentages of GDP)
di = (projected) public debt for year i (in percentages of GDP)
r = interest rate
g = GDP growth rate
ty = chosen target year
It should be stressed that, as S2 (nor S1) is not discounted back to the current year, the exact value of this
indicator depends on the chosen target year and will be higher, the further this target year lies in the
future.
By choosing the appropriate discount factor -   ) 1 /( 1 r g   in the formula above with, more specifically,
r being set equal to the implicit interest rate on public debt - the definition of S2 is clearly linked to the
law of motion of the public debt ratio. Since the primary balance is assumed to be affected by the ageing
costs only and, hence, stays constant after the last year covered by projections of ageing costs, compliance
with the intertemporal budget constraint then implies a constant public debt ratio after that year, as
shown in Box 1. As the AWG projections currently cover the years up to 2050, S2 is actually equal to the
fiscal effort needed in a given target year to reach a debt-stabilising budget balance in 2050. The
corresponding debt ratio reached in 2050 (and maintained thereafter) differs from country to country and
depends on the implicit interest rate (which, however, is the same for all countries concerned according to
the assumptions used here) and economic growth after 2050 and the primary balance reached in 2050 (see
box 1). The latter depends in turn on the initial conditions and the ageing costs.
Box 1 - The intertemporal budget constraint, the S2 indicator and debt dynamics
The European Commission uses the S2 indicator to operationalise the theoretical benchmark of the
intertemporal budget constraint. The purpose of this box is to show that in the particular circumstances
studied in this paper (and also assumed by the European Commission to calculate S2) with the activity
growth, the implicit interest rate on public debt and the primary balance being assumed constant after a
certain date (2050), the S2 indicator is equivalent to imposing a constant public debt ratio from that date
onwards.
The intertemporal budget constraint generally implies:
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with: d i = debt ratio in year i
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pbi = the ratio of the primary balance to GDP in year i
g = nominal GDP growth (assumed constant, for simplicity)
r = the implicit interest rate on public debt (assumed constant, for simplicity)
if pb pb pb T j T j     ²  , then (1) reduces to:
¦ ¦
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(6), which means that: d d d T j t j     ²  : (7)
Hence, the S2 indicator is equivalent to imposing a constant debt ratio in the post-2050 period.
The S2 indicator is also re-calculated here using 2015 as the target year and taking into account the same
assumptions as for S1. According to this indicator, public finances are currently only sustainable in
Finland. For all other countries the value for S2 is positive, ranging from 0.7% of GDP in Austria to close
to 13% of GDP for Greece. Similarly, the European Commission (4/2006) only considers public finances
sustainable in Finland according to the S2 indicator; however it indicates a much smaller adjustment effort
for the remaining countries. The constant debt ratios reached as of 2050, if the fiscal adjustment
suggested by the S2 indicator was implemented, also vary greatly, from more than 50% of GDP in Italy to
large negative debt ratios in Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg and Greece. Differences in the stable end-of-
period debt ratio are mainly related to the primary balance reached at the end of the period by the
different countries. In the Italian case, for instance, the primary balance is still positive, which implies a
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positive debt ratio in 2050 (as the implicit interest rate on public debt exceeds nominal GDP growth for
all countries). This is also the case for other countries with relatively low ageing costs such as Austria and
France. For countries with much higher ageing-related expenditure increases, such as Ireland,
Luxembourg, Spain and Greece, the adjustment effort implied by S2 would lead to a primary deficit - and,
hence, a negative debt ratio - in 2050.
Graph 2.3 - Sustainability indicators: S22015
(percentages of GDP)
2.2.2  Alternative sustainability indicators
Two alternative sustainability indicators are proposed in Langenus (2006). The first one, S3, is a variant of
the S2 indicator used by the European Commission. Rather than defining the budgetary adjustment
required to reach a debt-stabilising budget balance in 2050 (or, more generally, at the end of the period
considered) as an 'abrupt' increase in the target year, the required adjustment is calibrated as a gradual
improvement of the primary balance in the years leading up to the target year. As the fiscal adjustment
starts earlier, S3 is typically somewhat lower than S2, all other things equal.
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The second alternative indicator, S4 (originally used by Delbecque and Bogaert (1994)) measures the
required gradual adjustment in the primary balance in the period up to the target year in order to reach a
balanced budget by 2050. Like S1, this indicator does in principle not restrict debt dynamics and may
correspond to a rising public debt ratio after the period considered. However, since the restriction
imposed by S4 (a balanced budget in 2050) is stronger than the one associated with S1 (a debt ratio of
60% in 2050), the public finance position at the end of the period considered implied by S4 is typically
much sounder than the one implied by S1.
Table 2.1 - Sustainability indicators: S3 2015 and S4 2015
(percentages of GDP)












Finland -0.4 4.1 -38.5 -0.7 3.7 -19.2
Austria 0.7 2.6 10.6 0.7 2.7 5.7
Germany 1.2 4.5 -18.8 1.1 4.4 -10.0
Italy 1.4 4.3 48.7 1.8 4.7 25.1
Spain 3.5 7.1 -139.8 2.4 6.0 -75.9
Belgium 3.1 6.3 -20.1 2.9 6.1 -9.7
Netherlands 4.1 4.8 -26.7 3.8 4.5 -12.2
Ireland 5.5 5.6 -130.5 4.1 4.3 -64.4
Portugal 4.4 4.4 -45.5 4.1 4.0 -24.6
France 4.4 3.9 7.4 4.4 4.0 3.5
Luxembourg 7.8 7.9 -130.4 5.6 5.7 -43.2
Greece 12.0 10.8 -151.5 10.8 9.6 -80.2
1
Figures in bold italics indicate a rising debt ratio in the post-2050 period if the 2050 primary balance is kept constant as a percentage of GDP.
Both of the alternative sustainability indicators were calculated taking into account the same assumptions
as for S1 and S2. The results for S3 are very much in line with those for S2: public finances currently only
seem to be sustainable in Finland. All other countries will need to adjust their fiscal policy. Sustainability
gaps are much smaller in Austria, Germany and Italy than in Ireland, Portugal, France, Luxembourg and,
especially, Greece. As for S2, substantial negative public debt ratios are associated with the fiscal
adjustment effort implied by S3 in many of the countries considered.
The results for the S4 indicator are quite similar. The ranking of countries on the basis of sustainability
concerns is only marginally different: Finland is again the only country where public finances appear to be
sustainable while the biggest sustainability gaps are found for the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal, France,
Luxembourg and, especially, Greece. Debt ratios in 2050 associated with the adjustment effort implied by
S4 range from 25% in Italy to large negative values in Greece, Spain and Ireland. For some countries,
deficit-debt dynamics at the end of the period considered are unfavourable with the debt ratios set to
worsen as of 2050 if the primary balance is kept constant. However, in the sample this is only the case for
countries that post negative debt ratios in 2050.
All in all, the analysis carried out in this section clearly shows that population ageing jeopardises fiscal
s u s t a i n a b i l i t y  i n  a l l  t h e  e u r o  a r e a  c o u n t r i e s  c o n s i d e r e d  e x c e p t  F i n l a n d .  T h e  a c t u a l  m e a s u r e m e n t  o f
sustainability gaps differs depending on the indicators used and, more specifically, their definition of the
adjustment effort required to restore sustainability. However, the lowest sustainability gaps are typically
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found for Austria, Germany and Italy - countries that have undertaken more important pension reforms
in the recent past - while the problems appear to be more severe in the Netherlands, Ireland, Portugal,
France, Luxembourg and, in particular, Greece.
The sustainability indicators used here are based upon a concrete specification of the adjustment effort
needed to close the sustainability gap. By their construction, they are typically of the 'pre-funding' type, i.e.
they measure the size of an 'early' adjustment effort, as the chosen target year usually does not lie very far
in the future. However, this should by no means be interpreted as a policy recommendation: the
indicators only measure the size of the problem taking the medium term as the relevant benchmark, they
do not imply anything about the appropriateness of such a relatively early adjustment effort to restore
f i s c a l  s u s t a i n a b i l i t y .  T h e  i s s u e  o f  w h i c h  p o l i c y  r e s p o n s e  i s  m o r e  a p p r o p r i a t e  -  e . g .  t h e  ' e a r l y '  f i s c a l
adjustment measured by the sustainability indicators or a more gradual restoration of fiscal sustainability
over the whole 2008-2050 period - can only be addressed on the basis of clearly defined criteria and this is
done in the next section.
3 Intergenerational distribution effects of alternative adjustment strategies
3.1 Introduction
So far we have looked at the implications of demographic ageing on the public expenditure of twelve euro
area countries on the basis of AWG projections. We have adjusted these estimates where it was deemed
appropriate and derived new headline figures for the expected increase in the ratio of ageing-related
expenditure to GDP (section 1). On the basis of these new headline estimates sustainability gaps for the
twelve countries considered were calculated and it was shown that current policies are not sustainable for
most countries (section 2).
In this section, the relative merits of different budgetary strategies to ensure fiscal sustainability are
investigated. This question has received considerable attention from EU political bodies for a long time.
In a report to the March 2001 European Council of Stockholm, the Commission and the Ecofin Council
agreed on a three-pronged strategy for addressing the budgetary consequences of demographic ageing: i)
achieving or maintaining budget balances that reduce public debt at a fast pace and thereby lower interest
payments and allow for a (partial) pre-funding of ageing-related costs; ii) raising employment rates
especially amongst older workers and women, and iii) reforming social transfer systems (possibly
including funding of public pensions). More recently, the debate has gained momentum. In the context of
the 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, the Council called for implicit liabilities to be taken into
account in the determination of medium-term budgetary objectives (MTOs) for EU member states. In the
debate on how to implement this request, one of the main questions is to what extent future ageing-
related expenditure should be pre-funded by attaining high primary surpluses in the following years.
In principle, many different combinations and characteristics of the three-pronged strategy defined in
2001 are conceivable. Here, the focus is exclusively on the budgetary component, i.e. different choices
concerning the adjustments to the (primary) budget balance. However, the methodology suggested here
can in principle be extended to also include specific reforms aimed at increasing participation rates or
reducing ageing-related expenditure. In any case, the impact of past reforms and a gradual increase in
participation rates are already included in the adjusted AWG projections which form the basis of this
section.
A range of criteria can be applied when assessing the appropriateness of different budgetary strategies.
For example, the impact on economic growth could be considered. An early adjustment might require a
pronounced fiscal tightening over the following years, which could prove to be disruptive to the economy
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in the short run, even tough it might lead to higher GDP in the long run.21 In this paper, we only look at
the criterion of intergenerational distribution.
Budgetary strategies can differ with respect to a number of dimensions. We show results that compare
strategies affecting different sets of budgetary categories: The case of a lump sum tax is simulated by
distributing the adjustment burden equally on persons of all ages while an increase e.g. in social security
contributions is modelled by burdening the working age population only. However, the main focus is on
strategies that differ with respect to the timing of the adjustment effort. Therefore, an ‘early adjustment’
scenario, closing the sustainability gap by 2015, along the lines suggested by the S4 indicator, is compared
to a ‘gradual adjustment’ scenario, in which consolidation is stretched out over the period 2008-2050.
To make sure that the conclusions of the analysis are robust with respect to countries’ initial conditions
and ageing prospects, a sufficiently diverse group of euro area member states is selected: i) Germany with
a low sustainability gap due to a relatively favourable initial budget balance and a slightly below average
increase in ageing-related expenditure, ii) Belgium which has a medium-sized sustainability gap, despite a
relatively favourable initial budget balance, due to a sharp projected increase in ageing-related expenditure,
a n d  i i i )  F r a n c e  w h i c h  h a s  a  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  l a r g e  su s t a i n a b i li t y  g a p ,  d e s p i t e  a  b e l o w  a v e r a g e  e x p e c t e d
increase in ageing-related expenditure, due to an unfavourable initial budgetary position. 22
3.2 Methodology and data
In the literature, issues of intergenerational distribution are usually analysed within the framework of
generational accounting.23 Like most sustainability indicators, generational accounting takes into account
the intertemporal budget constraint. However, it adds an intergenerational perspective to the analysis.
This is achieved by calculating the present value of total net tax payments to the government over the
(remaining) lifetime of a cohort born in a specific year, where net tax payments are defined as taxes paid
minus transfers received.24 This present value of net tax payments is labelled generational account. The
intergenerational distribution of the net tax burden is analysed by comparing the generational accounts of
different cohorts.25
Usually, the generational account of a newborn in the base year is compared to that of future generations
(those born after the base year). According to the customary, albeit arbitrary, convention in generational
accounting, all generations already living in the base year are exempted from the policy change necessary
to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint while any required adjustment effort is spread evenly over
all future generations. Therefore, generational accounts in general indicate a higher burden for future
generations if a sustainability gap exists.
21   See e.g. Hauner, Leigh and Skaarup (2007).
22   This assessment is based on the results for the S4 indicator shown in table 2.1. The European Commission (2008) judges
the three considered countries to be at “medium risk” with Germany being a borderline case to low risk.
23   A different approach has been suggested by Langenus and Eugène (2005) and applied by Langenus (2006). They compare
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  b u d g e t a r y  s t r a t e g i e s  o n  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  a n  a v e r a g e  w o r k i n g - a g e  p e r s o n ’ s  f i n a n c i a l
contribution to the government’s primary balance over time. They regard a situation in which successive generations of
workers contribute roughly the same amount, corrected for nominal wage growth, as “intergenerationally fair”. The main
d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h i s  a n d  t h e  g e n e r a t i o n a l  a c c o u n t i n g  a p p r o a c h  i s  t h a t  t h e y  t a k e  a  c r o s s - s e c t i o n  i n s t e a d  o f  a
longitudinal perspective, as they focus on net tax payments for individual years rather than over the total lifetime of a
cohort.
24   In some studies, not only transfers but also other government expenditure such as spending on general administration,
domestic and external security, and investment are allocated (evenly) to different cohorts.
25 Of course, only generational accounts at birth are comparable as the generational account of e.g. a 30-year old person fails
to reflect the net tax payments already borne over the first three decades of his/her life. For a more detailed description
of the generational accounting approach see, for example, Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1994), Raffelhüschen (1999)
or Bonin (2001).
2021
In this section, we in principle follow the generational accounting approach. However, the conventional
generational accounting methodology has several drawbacks with regard to our objective and we tried to
accommodate this by introducing some modifications. Firstly, most generational accounting studies for
Europe forecast pension expenditure on the basis of their own models. These models are necessarily less
elaborate than the sometimes very sophisticated pension models and databases that are used in
projections by national institutions. Since future pension expenditure is determined not only by cohort
effects but also by numerous legislative changes the full impact of which is sometimes only felt after
several decades, it is preferable to revert to pension forecasts made with large models and a
comprehensive database. This might be less obvious for other revenue and expenditure categories which
are less influenced by effects that fully mature only after a long time. By basing our calculations on the
(adjusted) AWG projections, we benefited from the detailed national forecasts that enter these
projections.26 This approach also ensures consistency – except for the adjustments made in section 1 -
with the AWG projections which underlie the sustainability analysis at the European level. However, this
procedure also implies that all revenue and expenditure categories not deemed to be age-specific by the
AWG are distributed evenly over all cohorts – an assumption that is clearly not in line with empirical
f a c t s .  H o w e v e r ,  w i t h  a  m o r e  e x t e n s i v e  d a t a b a s e ,  t h i s  e x e r c i s e  c o u l d  b e  e x t e n d e d  t o  a  f u l l y - f l e d g e d
generational accounting procedure with age-specific expenditure profiles for a wide range of additional
budgetary categories.
A second drawback of the standard generational accounting approach is that the focus is on two cohorts
only – newborns and those born one year later (representing future generations). As shown, for example,
by Bonin (2001), with increasing life expectancy and policy measures that become effective only in the
future, generational accounts of future generations cannot just be represented by the cohort born
immediately after the base year: the generational account changes for every future generation. Moreover,
considering the full lifetime generational accounts only of cohorts born in the base year (2007 in our
study) or later implies that the intergenerational redistribution between all currently living cohorts can not
be analysed correctly. We therefore explicitly calculate total lifetime generational accounts for the cohorts
born between 1970 and 2050.27 To our knowledge, this has rarely been done before.28
We then compare lifetime generational accounts under different budgetary strategies. Instead of explicitly
targeting an ‘optimal’ strategy that minimises intergenerational redistribution, we compare two strategies
that differ in the timing of the adjustment. In the first strategy, named early adjustment approach, the
primary balance is increased in equal yearly steps until 2015 to ensure a balanced budget in 2050. In the
second strategy, named gradual approach, the fiscal adjustment is spread out over the whole 2008-2050
period. This gradual adjustment is calibrated to generate the same public debt ratio in 2150 as the early
a d j u s t m e n t  s t r a t e g y  w i t h  a  v i e w  t o  m a k i n g  b o t h  s t r a t e g i e s  c o m p a r a b l e  w h e n  a n a l y s i n g  t h e i r
intergenerational implications.
The restriction of an identical public debt ratio in 2150 may not be fully satisfactory when comparing the
lifetime burden for two alternative budgetary strategies of generations born until 2050 only as the public
debt ratio in 2150 is obviously also affected by (part of) the lifetime burden of generations born in the
2051-2150 period. Theoretically, a comparison of alternative budgetary strategies on the basis of
intergenerational equity may then be biased by neglecting the generations born after 2050. However,
alternative restrictions to make the budgetary strategies considered comparable - e.g. an identical debt
ratio in 2050 - were deemed to be less appropriate.
26   A drawback of this procedure is that these models are often not fully disclosed to the public and therefore are largely a
‘black box’ to outsiders. The AWG tries to overcome this problem by a peer review process.
27   While more generations are alive in the period 1970 to 2150 in which we analyse public finance developments, only for
cohorts born between 1970 and 2050 their whole lifespan is covered.
28   One example is Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlifkoff (1995).
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Once the calculations are done, we need a criterion to decide which strategy has the more equitable
distributional consequences. In the literature, several alternatives are proposed. Among the most
prominent are the utilitarian social welfare function, that under restrictive assumptions implies
redistribution until complete equality is achieved, and the maximin criterion proposed by Rawls, which
maximises the utility of the person with the minimum utility.29 However, the assumptions under which
these results are derived are highly questionable and it is unclear how this should be applied in an
intertemporal setting. In this regard, taking a constant net tax burden across different generations as a
benchmark is an appealing solution. It is an economical solution in terms of computational effort, it is
easily understood and has the property to give equal weight to present and future generations even though
the latter do not take part in current political decision-making process. It needs to be pointed out,
however, that the intergenerational distribution of the burden imposed by government budgetary activity
is ultimately a normative question that does not have clear-cut answers.30 An efficiency argument may
also be made for an even distribution of lifetime net tax payments, as Barro (1979) has shown that an
unchanged tax ratio minimises the deadweight loss of taxation.31
Therefore, in this paper an adjustment strategy will be deemed preferable if it leads to a flatter time profile
for the total net tax burden across cohorts born in different years. This assumes that a relatively constant
net lifetime contribution to the government's primary balance (deflated by nominal per capita GDP)
across generations can be deemed equitable. This is methodologically close to imposing a constant
lifetime net tax rate for all generations – a concept named generational balance in the generational
accounting literature. Alternative definitions could pertain to keeping either the absolute (discounted)
amount of the lifetime contribution constant across generations or the difference between market income
and this amount constant across generations. These definitions would be consistent with a net tax rate
that is, respectively, constantly decreasing or increasing over time.
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In this equation, D represents the highest age considered, s z a h , ,  the age-specific per capita amounts of
individual revenue and primary expenditure categories z for a person of age a in year s and Ss,k the
likelihood of a person born in k to survive until period s, while r denotes the discount rate.
The age-profiles h for the individual ageing-related expenditure categories (pension, health, long-term
care, unemployment and education) are taken from various sources.32 However, the delineation of these
sources often does not exactly match those in the national accounts. It is therefore clear that the payment
profiles obtained in this way and extrapolated to cover the population as a whole deviate from the
aggregate figures shown in the national accounts. For this reason we adopt a two-stage approach, as is
customary in the literature. In the first stage, the age-specific payment profiles are derived from the
various data sources. In the second stage, the age-specific per capita amounts are multiplied by a scaling
factor which is uniform for all age groups. This scaling factor is defined so as to ensure that in the
aggregate - taking into accou n t  the  size of t he ag e classes - t he  respec tive natio nal accou nt  figu re is
reached. In other words, while in the first stage only the relative positions of persons of different ages are
determined, in the second stage the absolute payment profiles are calculated.
29   See e.g. Rosen (1999) and Rawls (1971).
30   In fact, similar to progressive income taxation, an intertemporally rising net tax rate has sometimes been proposed in the
literature in order to redistribute from (richer) future to (poorer) currently living generations.
31   However, Barro’s proposition only holds under certain assumptions and moreover relates to the (marginal) tax rate while
here we refer to net taxes (taxes minus transfers).
32   As pointed out above, all other budget categories are distributed evenly over all age classes.
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This two-stage approach not only ensures consistency between absolute age-specific payment profiles and
the national accounts data but also allows us to circumvent the limitation that we usually have relative
payment profiles only for one point in time. Since the relative payment profiles typically change little over
time, it is possible to use relative payment profiles which were obtained before (or after) the year under
consideration, without this involving a major error.33 By contrast, the national accounts data needed for
calculating the absolute payment profiles (which are subject to stronger fluctuations) are available for all
years in the period from 1970 to 2050.
The national accounts figures for the years from 1970 to 2007 for the five age-related expenditure items,
the (primary) balance and GDP are available from national statistical institutes. However, the delineation
often differs from that used by the AWG. Therefore a scaling factor was used in order to align national
accounts figures to the AWG definition.34 For the period 2008 to 2050 we used the adjusted AWG
projections derived in section 1. For the years 2050 to 2150 we held the absolute age-profiles we obtained
for 2050 constant (except for an adjustment for inflation and per capita GDP growth) and computed the
macroeconomic aggregates by combining these profiles with the population forecast.
The population data are likewise taken from national sources for past years while AWG figures were used
for the years up to 2050.35 After 2050 the population is held constant in the baseline. However, keeping
not only overall population size but also population structure at the 2050 level is clearly not realistic for
most countries. This is why in a sensitivity analysis we also calculated national accounts on the basis of an
explicit population projection that applies the AWG’s fertility, mortality and migration assumptions for
2050 to the following years as well.
Concerning the discount rate employed for deriving the present value of lifetime net tax payments, we
relied on the AWG’s assumption of a real interest rate of 3% and inflation of 2% for future years. For the
past we used the yield on long-term bonds issued by the respective government. The absolute payment
profiles for the years after 2050 were extrapolated with the growth rate of GDP per capita, while GDP
was expected to continue to grow with the rate assumed by the AWG for the period 2040 to 2050. The
latter assumption reflects the method chosen by the Commission, and adopted also in section 2 of this
paper, for the calculation of sustainability indicators. In order to make lifetime net tax payments of
different cohorts comparable, they were discounted by the nominal growth rate of per capita GDP. While
other methods are conceivable, this implies that the lifetime net tax payment is adjusted for increases in
GDP per capita for successive cohorts. So when cohorts are shown to have the same lifetime net tax
payments this does not imply that their absolute net tax payments are equal, but that their lifetime net
payments in relation to per capita GDP at birth are similar.
Obviously, all the methodological and data limitations that fully-fledged generational accounting exercises
are subject to also apply to our more restricted approach.36 Moreover, since we follow the AWG’s
presumption that most revenue and expenditure categories are not age-specific, while in fact generational
accounting studies have shown a clear lifecycle pattern for them, the absolute value of our lifetime net tax
payments should be interpreted with great caution. The same holds for the differences in the total lifetime
burden between countries as well as between males and females. The latter depend on a sometimes
33   While most policy measures leave the relative age-specific payments profiles unaffected, these profiles change, for
example in the case of a legislated increase in the retirement age.
34   The scaling factor reflects the difference between national accounts and AWG data for 2004. In the case of Germany, a
similar procedure was applied to link east German to west German data for the years before reunification. In addition for
Germany some budgetary items like e.g. development aid were assumed not to benefit or burden the resident population.
Also therefore results are not fully comparable between countries.
35   Survival probabilities for past years were obtained from the Human Mortality Database, University of California, Berkeley
(USA), and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Germany). Available at http://www.mortality.org or
http://www.humanmortality.de. As pointed out in section 1, the data from the AWG relate to the reference scenario and
are not fully compatible with the adjusted headline scenario.
36   See Havemann (1994), Raffelhüschen (1999), or Manzke (2002).
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arbitrary allocation of payments within households. This is why we chose to show either the lifetime net
tax payments for women or for men for a specific country. The comparison between the lifetime net tax
payments of different cohorts is, however, more meaningful. Nevertheless, our results should be treated
with some caution when drawing policy conclusions. While the basic methodological framework we use
is, in our view, adequate for analysing intergenerational distribution issues, we were confronted with
considerable deficiencies on the data side. Our results should therefore be taken as an indication for what
would be possible with a more complete data set.
3.3  Results: comparing the lifetime net tax burden of alternative adjustment strategies for different cohorts
3.3.1 Results for the baseline
In the baseline scenario we compare the intergenerational distribution of lifetime net tax payments of
different cohorts under the assumption that the required adjustment is accomplished by increasing the
primary budget balance through any of the non-ageing related categories. This implies that the adjustment
burden is distributed evenly over all age classes. The picture that emerges in this case is quite similar for
the three countries considered (compare graphs 3.1 to 3.3). Earlier-born cohorts who have already entered
into working age face the lowest burden, while later-born generations have to pay much higher net taxes.
The burden increase is very steep between the 1980 cohort and the 2005 cohort (1970 and 1995 for
Belgium). For subsequent cohorts, the burden declines slightly under the early adjustment strategy, while
it keeps increasing – though less rapidly than between the 1980 and 2005 cohorts – under the gradual
adjustment strategy (with the exception of Germany, where the burden declines after the 2005 cohort also
under the gradual adjustment strategy). As could be expected, the lines for the early adjustment and the
gradual strategy are quite close together in the case of Germany, which has a small sustainability gap, and
are wider apart for the other two countries, where larger adjustment efforts are needed. In fact, if
sustainability had already been attained and no further adjustments were required, the lines would match
exactly. None of the strategies considered would, however, sufficiently burden currently living generations
and alleviate future generations to achieve an even intergenerational distribution.37
Visual inspection of graphs 3.1 to 3.3 already reveals that the early adjustment strategy leads to more even
outcomes than the gradual one. In all three countries considered, it levies a higher burden on earlier-born
cohorts who, compared to later-born cohorts, face a lower burden and relieves cohorts born later that
face higher net tax payments than older cohorts. The crossing of the two lines, which indicates a lower
burden under early adjustment for all later-born cohorts, is reached around the year 2016, while the
highest burden under early adjustment is borne by the cohorts born about a decade earlier. For France
and Belgium, the burden for generations born close to the middle of the 21
st century obtained under the
gradual approach would be markedly higher than the peak burden for generations born around 2005
under early adjustment. For Germany, the peak is attained around 2005 under both strategies and is
slightly higher under early adjustment.
37   A higher burden on currently living generations could be attained by concentrating the adjustment effort on the elderly.
However, as pointed out earlier, searching for budgetary strategies that lead to an even intergenerational distribution is
not the objective of this paper.
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The conclusion that the early adjustment strategy leads to a more even intergenerational distribution is
confirmed by the range of indicators displayed in table 3.1. The maximum burden, the difference between
the maximum and the minimum burden and the standard deviation all point to a more favourable
outcome under early adjustment. As already apparent from the graphs, the maximum burden for
Germany is the only exception while the difference between the maximum and the minimum burden is
about the same for that country. Nevertheless, as shown in table 3.1, even for Germany the standard
deviation (and the coefficient of variation) is lower in the case of early adjustment.38
38   Indeed, at least for our sample of countries, the intergenerational distribution of the early adjustment strategy seems to be
the more even compared to the gradual adjustment strategy the larger the initial sustainability gap.
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   Women 58,200 65,100 12,800 15,600 20.4 24.1 76,000 78,800
   Men 55,200 65,800 12,900 16,100 23.0 27.9 66,900 73,300
Germany
   Women 56,300 56,300 29,600 30,400 25.7 26.2 140,400 139,600
   Men 52,500 52,500 26,500 27,400 26.7 27.3 121,600 120,500
France
   Women 55,800 78,100 19,900 27,000 19.7 25.9 117,700 134,900
   Men 49,400 72,600 18,500 25,600 23.9 32.3 92,300 109,400
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
3.3.2 Sensitivity analysis
In order to test the robustness of our results, we performed several sensitivity analyses. First, we tested
the impact of an alternative assumption on the distribution of the adjustment burden over the different
age groups. In fact, it seems quite reasonable to expect that the adjustment burden will not be spread out
evenly over all age-classes but will be concentrated on the population of  working-age. Indeed, it is a well
established outcome of fully-fledged generational accounting studies that the working-age population
bears the highest net tax burden. We therefore ran a scenario with the adjustment burden only on persons
between 20 and 59 years old. The outcome can be taken as an indication of the intergenerational burden
distribution when sustainability is achieved e.g. by increasing social security contributions. Graphs 3.4 to
3.6 show that the date after which newborns would prefer the early adjustment to the gradual strategy falls
a b o u t  a  d e c a d e  e a r l i e r  f o r  a l l  t h r e e  c o u n t r i e s .  M o r e o v e r ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t w o  s t r a t e g i e s
increases for earlier-born cohorts. Nevertheless, the intergenerational distribution indicators depicted in
table 3.2 indicate that the basic conclusion that early adjustment entails a more even distribution continues
to hold. Indeed, all indicators except for the maximum burden for Belgium and Germany support this
finding.


















   Women 69,500 71,800 14,300 18,400 21.8 26.9 87,400 80,800
   Men 66,000 70,600 13,800 18,800 23.2 29.9 78,800 74,900
Germany
   Women 58,000 60,900 30,100 31,400 25.6 26.6 144,300 143,700
   Men 54,300 57,100 27,000 28,400 26.5 27.8 125,600 125,000
France
   Women 59,900 82,600 18,600 31,400 17.5 28.6 127,700 135,800
   Men 55,900 82,300 17,200 29,900 20.4 34.1 102,700 112,500
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
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We also tested the robustness of our results with respect to the assumption of constant population size
and structure after 2050. This assumption is clearly unrealistic. It would involve not only a sudden jump in
fertility rates but also high migration for some age groups. As it turns out, explicitly forecasting the
population after 2050 actually reinforces our conclusions (see graphs 3.7 and 3.8 as well as table 3.3). For
Germa ny, when t he m ortality, fertility and migration rates pr ojected  by th e AWG for 2050 are also
applied to the following years,39 t h e  e a r l y  a d j u s t m e n t  s t r a t e g y  i s  p r e f e r r e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  a l l
intergenerational distribution indicators. The true burden of the cohorts born between 1980 and 2040 is
overestimated in the constant population scenario. For France, the changes are less pronounced but go in
the same direction.40
39   With the population forecast the overall population falls to 58.0 million and the dependency ratio to 51.8% by 2100
compared to 75.4 million and 53.1% with a constant population.
40   We did not run this exercise for Belgium.
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   Women 53,100 59,500 30,400 32,100 25.9 27.3 137,800 140,700
   Men 47,000 52,200 25,800 27,500 26.2 27.7 117,100 119,000
France
   Women 52,700 78,100 18,800 26,300 19.1 25.9 113,900 134,300
   Men 44,800 68,400 16,300 23,700 22.3 31.4 87,200 105,000
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
As a third sensitivity test, instead of making net tax burdens of different cohorts comparable by adjusting
for the increase in GDP per capita between the respective birth years, lifetime net tax rates can be
calculated which show the relation between the present value of lifetime net tax payments and the present
value of lifetime GDP per capita. The latter was calculated by discounting back to the year of birth GDP
per capita observed over the lifetime taking into account survival probabilities. As shown for Germany, in
this case the lines are smoother and the shapes also change somewhat. In the 1970s, the burden now
increases for later-born cohorts while it falls in the baseline scenario (graph 3.9). This seems to be related
to the negative interest growth differential that prevailed for many years of that decade and which distorts
the picture somewhat in the baseline. Our basic conclusion, however, again remains untouched (table 3.4).
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   Women 3.0 3.3 2.2 2.2 24.1 24.6 10.2 10.4
   Men 3.0 3.3 2.0 2.1 24.8 25.5 9.2 9.4
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
The choice of the discount rate is a tricky question which has often been discussed in generational
accounting studies.41 In our baseline scenario we used the interest rate assumed by the AWG for future
years for discounting (real interest rate of 3% and inflation of 2%). For the past we relied on the yield on
long-term bonds issued by the respective government. Thus, the real discount rate is not constant over
the whole period. As a first step towards a sensitivity analysis concerning the discount rate it was assumed
that the real discount rate was constant from 1970 onwards at 3% while leaving past inflation untouched.
In the result, cohorts’ burdens are roughly unchanged compared to the baseline, with the largest changes
obviously arising for older cohorts, and lines for the two scenarios cross in the same year (see chart 3.10).
Moreover, our basic conclusion again remains unchanged (table 3.5). The second step of the discount rate
sensitivity analysis was to change the level of the constant discount rate to 5%.42 This leads to  two
conclusions. First, cohorts’ burden is now lower than in the baseline scenario (or the ‘constant 3%
scenario’), especially for cohorts born after the 1990s. Thus, assuming a higher discount rate gives the
impression that intergenerational distribution is more even (see the direct comparison of the coefficient of
variation with 3% and 5% in table 3.5). The second and more important conclusion is that when we
assume a constant 5% discount rate the lines cross more or less at the same time as in the baseline
scenario (2023 vs. 2016) and early adjustment still entails a more even distribution (see chart 3.11 and
table 3.5).
41   See for example Accardo (1998) for France.
42   This implies that for years after 2008 there is no identity anymore between the discount rate and the interest rate which is
used to calculate the government interest burden.
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   Women 42,600 68,600 15,900 24,000 15.5 22.9 116,000 134,900
   Men 43,000 68,800 15,900 23,900 20.3 29.9 91,500 109,400
constant d.r. 5%
   Women 34,200 48,600 12,900 16,900 14.7 19.4 99,100 109,600
   Men 34,300 48,600 13,000 17,000 15.7 20.6 94,400 104,800
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
Finally, a first small step towards the outcome of a fully-fledged generational accounting exercise can be
taken by distributing the burden of the sum of all budget categories not considered to be age-specific by
the AWG to persons aged between 20 and 99 years in the scenario with an explicit population forecast for
the years after 2050. With the impact of old-age expenditure like pensions, health and long-term care and
education for the young determined separately, this is more in line with the age-profiles obtained in
generational accounting studies. In this scenario the results change substantially, as illustrated by the case
of Germany (chart 3.12). The overall burden is much lower now, backing our earlier note of caution on
the reliability of absolute numbers. Moreover, the pattern over cohorts also changes somewhat. The
increase for cohorts born after 1980 ends earlier and is significantly less steep. Moreover, the crossing of
t h e  l i n e s  f o r  e a r l y  a n d  g r a d u a l  a d j u s t m e n t  o c c u r s  a l m o s t  t w o  d e c a d e s  e a r l i e r .  H o w e v e r ,  o u r  b a s i c
conclusions not only continue to hold but are actually reinforced (table 3.6).
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Table 3.6: Intergenerational distribution indicators (budget categories assumed to be non-



















   Women 21,700 27,100 10,600 12,100 26.6 29.0 47,700 52,000
   Men 13,800 19,100 5,600 7,100 29.7 34.5 23,000 27,100
*  In euros, deflated by per capita GDP growth
Maximum burden minus
minimum burden*
Standard deviation* Coefficient of variation Maximum Burden*
Overall, the conclusions derived under the baseline scenario seem to be quite robust with respect to a
variety of conceivable variations in underlying parameters and assumptions. From the perspective of
intergenerational burden distribution, a rapid adjustment of the primary balance to a sustainable level
seems to be preferable to a more gradual approach. Nevertheless, care needs to be exercised when
interpreting the results. Data restrictions only allowed us to compare cohorts born since 1970. So a
substantial part of the living population could not be included in the analysis.43 Moreover, even for this
period the underlying data are sometimes of poor quality or had to be estimated. Finally, whether a
specific intergenerational distribution is preferred depends on normative presumptions that could be
questioned.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we analyse (budgetary policy responses to) fiscal sustainability against the backdrop of
population ageing. With respect to the budgetary costs of ageing, the projections carried out by the AWG,
which was established within the EU's Economic Policy Committee, can be considered as an important
reference point. In its 2006 report (EPC and EC, 2006) the AWG estimates, on the basis of a scenario
43   These cohorts might be expected to be less affected by the budgetary consequences of demographic ageing. However, an
extension to cohorts born since 1960 for France had little impact on the results.
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taken as a reference, that ageing-related changes in five specific expenditure categories – pensions, health
care, long-term care, unemployment and education – can work out at an increase of the expenditure ratio
of slightly more than 4% of GDP for the EU and close to 4.5% of GDP for the euro area44 in the 2010-
2050 period. However, such long-term projections typically come with a very large degree of uncertainty.
After a detailed assessment of the projections for the ageing-related expenditure increases for individual
countries, we illustrate the upside risks to the AWG's headline projections via a harmonised mechanical
exercise that is mainly based upon the sensitivities reported for alternative scenarios considered by the
AWG. This exercise incorporates, if applicable, more recent estimates for the further increase in life
expectancy by 2050; assumes that the income elasticity of health care expenditure would remain constant
at 1.1 throughout the projection period rather than converge to 1 by 2050 as in the AWG headline
scenario; and takes into account an increasing importance of the formal sector in the provision of elderly
care due to changing family structures and rising female participation rates. It shows, in particular, that
plausible alternative assumptions on key parameters in the projections could significantly increase the
AWG estimates of ageing-related increases in government expenditure in the 2010-2050 period.
We consider a number of quantitative sustainability indicators to assess the sustainability of public
finances in euro area countries against the backdrop of population ageing. While there is no clear-cut
theoretical benchmark for fiscal sustainability, the 'conventional wisdom' is that continuously rising
and/or extremely high debt ratios are unsustainable. Hence, in practice, quantitative indicators of
sustainability gaps typically attempt to measure the fiscal effort required by a certain date to bring the debt
ratio back to a sustainable path or level taking into account the projected budgetary impact of ageing and
a set of assumptions (e.g. concerning the macroeconomic environment, the implicit interest rate on public
debt and deficit-debt adjustments). We argue that the two quantitative indicators that are routinely
considered by the EC (and that impose a 60% and a stable debt ratio by 2050 respectively) may be
complemented by other indicators, e.g. imposing a balanced budget by 2050.
While the exact numbers may differ significantly depending on the sustainability indicator used, the
ranking of the countries on the basis of their sustainability gaps is relatively robust. Countries that
currently record high fiscal surpluses (e.g. Finland) or have undertaken more important structural reforms
to their pensions systems (e.g. Germany, Austria and Italy) tend to experience lower sustainability risks.
All indicators confirm that, of the countries considered here (the euro area minus Slovenia, Malta and
Cyprus), public finances are currently only sustainable in Finland. All other countries will have to adjust
their fiscal policies sooner or later.
Quantitative sustainability indicators such as those considered in this paper typically measure the size of a
relatively 'early' adjustment effort aimed at closing the sustainability gap. However, this should not be
interpreted as a policy recommendation: the indicators do not imply anything about the appropriateness
of such an early adjustment effort to restore fiscal sustainability compared to e.g. that of a more gradual
approach. In this connection, it should be stressed that, for many countries, implementing such an early
adjustment effort would lead to high surpluses in the coming years and a rapid reduction of public debt
ratios (and, in some cases, the building up of net financial asset positions).
The appropriateness of any specific budgetary strategy needs to be assessed on the basis of pre-defined
criteria. If intergenerational equity is considered to be a relevant criterion in this respect, generational
accounts or, more specifically, the total lifetime contribution of generations born in different years to the
government’s primary balance may be an important indicator to assess the relative merits of alternative
budgetary strategies. In this connection, the intergenerational implications of an 'early' adjustment strategy
(an increase in the primary balance by 2015 that is sufficient to absorb the ageing costs and still end up
with a balanced budget in 2050) are compared to those of a corresponding 'gradual' approach (that
44   As the Report was p ublish ed  in the b eginning  of  2006  the  EU  ex clud es Romania and  Bulgar ia wh ile the  euro ar ea
excludes Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta.
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spreads out the fiscal adjustment over the whole 2008-2050 period) for three countries – Belgium, France
and Germany – in this paper.
A number of tentative conclusions can be drawn from the evolution of the total lifetime burden in this
empirical exercise. First, a gradual adjustment is typically more favourable for older generations than for
generations born after a certain date. Second, this date falls later, i.e. generations that are worse off under
the gradual strategy are further away in the future if all generations contribute to the fiscal adjustment
than if only generations of working age do. Third, the ‘early’ adjustment strategy, implying significant
government surpluses in the coming years for the three countries considered, generally leads to flatter
time profiles of the total lifetime burden – and, hence, may be considered more equitable – than the
‘gradual’ fiscal adjustment.
While these findings have to be interpreted with caution, not least due to data limitations, they are of
particular relevance for the aforementioned upcoming revision of the medium-term objectives for fiscal
policy defined in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact. If intergenerational equity is considered to
be an important guiding principle in this respect, it could be made operational along the lines suggested
above. If our tentative results were confirmed, e.g. with a more complete dataset, and if no further cost-
cutting reforms to pensions and care systems are implemented, an upward revision of these medium-term
objectives to significant surpluses may then be warranted for many EU Member States.
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